1850-THE 1ST GREAT GAME IN/AT AFGHANISTAN AND THE 1ST REVOLT BY INDIAN ARMY--{FROM Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief} -FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS V.C.OF KANDAHAR -AFGANISTAN

                                                      FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA

                                                                                  FROM

                                                                 Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief


                                                                                       BY
  FIELD-MARSHAL    LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR V.C., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E                                                                  

                                
Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar
                                            .

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.1898

The Natives of India are particularly observant of character, and intelligent in gauging the capabilities of those who govern them; and it is because the English Government is trusted that a mere handful of Englishmen are able to direct the administration of a country with nearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in race, religion, and manners of life. Throughout all the changes which India has[page viii]undergone, political and social, during the present century, this feeling has been maintained, and it will last so long as the services are filled by honourable men who sympathize with the Natives, respect their prejudices, and do not interfere unnecessarily with their habits and customs.
.............I impute no blame to the Russians for their advance towards India. The force of circumstances—the inevitable result of the contact of civilization with barbarism—impelled them to cross the Jaxartes and extend their territories to the Khanates of Turkestan and the banks of the Oxus, just as the same uncontrollable force carried us across the Sutlej and extended our territories to the valley of the Indus.
                                               Piewar Kotal.
                                                                        PIEWAR KOTAL.

                                                       General Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B.
                                                                GENERAL SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS, G.C.B

                                                               Brigadier-General John Nicholson, C.B.
                                                                     BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C.B.

                                                                Major-General Sir Harry Tombs, V.C., G.C.B.
                                                          MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARRY TOMBS, V.C., G.C.B.

Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills-Johnes, V.C., G.C.B.
                 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES HILLS-JOHNES, V.C., G.C.B.

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART, BART., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.
                                           
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART, BART.,
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.
SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH IN AUGUST, 1857.
             SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH IN AUGUST, 1857.

A Plan to illustrate the Seige of Delhi, 1857.
                         SIEGE OF DELHI 1857
LORDS CLYDE AND SANDHURST. (SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AND SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.)

LORDS CLYDE AND SANDHURST.
(SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AND SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, K.C.B.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, K.C.B.

THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, November, 1857
THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, November, 1857
Engagement before CAWNPORE on the 6th. December 1857.
Engagement before CAWNPORE on the 6th. December 1857.
Plan of the Engagement on the Banks of the KALI NADI at KHUDAGANJ January 2nd. 1858.
Plan of the Engagement on the Banks of the KALI NADI at KHUDAGANJ January 2nd. 1858.

GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I.

LADY ROBERTS (WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS)
LADY ROBERTS
(WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS)


THE EARL CANNING, K.G., G.C.B., G.M.S.I.,VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
THE EARL CANNING, K.G., G.C.B., G.M.S.I.,
VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA

THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE 101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS)
THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE 101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS)

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

THE EARL OF LYTTON, G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY of INDIA.

THE EARL OF LYTTON, G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E.,
VICEROY OF INDIA.
THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL.
THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL.

MY GURKHA ORDERLIES.
GURKHA ORDERLIES.

MY SIKH ORDERLIES.
SIKH ORDERLIES.

ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES.
PATHAN ORDERLIES.
ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES.

PATHAN ORDERLIES.
ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR, KABUL.
ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR, KABUL.

Map of the CHARDEH VALLEY, KABUL, and the BALA HISSAR.

PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEFENCES OF SHERPUR AND THE OPERATIONS ROUND KABUL
12th to 23rd December, 1879.
CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL.
CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL.

SKETCH OF THE ROUTE TAKEN ON THE MARCH FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR. AUGUST. 1880.

THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS, GENERAL SIR ARTHUR E. HARDINGE, GENERAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART
                                            THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA

GENERAL SIR FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS.  GENERAL SIR ARTHUR E. HARDINGE. GENERAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART.

THE MARQUIS OF DUFFERIN, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY OF INDIA.
THE MARQUIS OF DUFFERIN, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E.
VICEROY OF INDIA.
HIS HIGHNESS ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.
HIS HIGHNESS
ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

MAP of THE RUSSIAN FRONTIERS in CENTRAL ASIA.

LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR.

LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY OF INDIA.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E.
VICEROY OF INDIA.


FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER 'VONOLEL.'
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER 'VONOLEL.'



CHAPTER I.

Forty years ago the departure of a cadet for India was a much more1852 serious affair than it is at present. Under the regulations then in force, leave, except on medical certificate, could only be obtained once during the whole of an officer's service, and ten years had to be spent in India before that leave could be taken. Small wonder, then, that I felt as if I were bidding England farewell for ever when, on the 20th February, 1852, I set sail from Southampton with Calcutta for my destination. Steamers in those days ran to and from India but once a month, and the fleet employed was only capable of transporting some 2,400 passengers in the course of a year. This does not include the Cape route; but even taking that into consideration, I should doubt whether there were then as many travellers to India in a year as there are now in a fortnight at the busy season
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................THE GREAT GAME STARTED BETWEEN RUSSIA UNDER CZAR AND BRITISH COLONIAL RULERS OF INDIA;IN 1850'S
U.S.A. GOT INVOLVED IN AFGHANISTAN; BECAUSE OF RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN .
NOW AMERICA IS FIGHTING ITS OWN CREATION-THE SAME MUSLIM JIHADS-TRAINED BY C.I.A. TO FIGHT THE RUSSIANS !!!!!!
IT IS NOT AMERICAN PEOPLE'S  FAULT;BUT IT IS DUE TO WRONG POLICIES OF AMERICAN POLITICIANS .



Afghanistan-1979-91




From the U.S. perspective, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan began in 1978, when a coup d'état brought a communist regime to power in Kabul. Over the next year, armed resistance grew, a trend which triggered approaches to the CIA by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Plans began to be drawn up for reversing “the current Soviet trend and presence in Afghanistan,” and in the summer of 1979, Carter approved covert aid to mujahedin guerrillas[[INCLUDING BIN LADEN!!!!!]]. Although this aid did not include arms, it provided nonmilitary supplies and cash with which weapons could be purchased. Six months later, the Soviets sent troops into Afghanistan, a move which immediately led Carter's National Security Adviser to advocate “more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels,” both directly and via Pakistan, China, and Islamic countries. For the next decade, the CIA aided the guerrillas, at first with weapons purchased from China, Egypt, and Pakistan, then with increasingly sophisticated U.S. arms (including Stinger missiles, shipped to the mujahedin at the same time as to UNITA). All told, U.S. aid in arms and cash totaled some $2 billion. Up through the late 1980s, American assistance was supplied through the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI), which also provided training; except on rare occasions, the CIA did not deal directly with the rebels. In addition, Saudi Arabia contributed significant sums of money to the resistance until, by the end of the 1980s, its financial role was greater than that of the U.S.



Eventually, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Early on in the negotiations, Washington had been willing to end its aid to the guerrillas in exchange for Soviet withdrawal. This concession was retracted at more or less the last minute, meaning that the Soviet-supplied regime in Kabul would continue to fight against U.S.-supplied guerrillas. However, things did not go as the CIA had planned. The Kabul government held out for several years, repulsing one after another CIA- and ISI-planned offensives. The U.S. had helped the ISI set up urban sabotage training for the mujahedin, and after the Soviets left, these techniques began to be used by the largest guerrilla movement against its rivals; that army also carried out indiscriminate rocket attacks that led to numerous civilian casualties; it was active in the heroin trade; and it espoused a brand of Islamic fundamentalism that led it to oppose the U.S. and the Saudis in the 1991 Gulf War. These factors, plus the fact that the Soviets had withdrawn their combat forces, made it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to sustain its policy. Already, even before the last Soviet troops had left, a State Department envoy was describing “a growing frustration, bordering on hostility, among Afghans across the ideological spectrum and from a broad range of backgrounds, toward the government of Pakistan and toward the U.S.” because of the extremist forces they were backing. Congress, after years of enthusiastically increasing the CIA's Afghan funds, began to cut the budget and demand that aid be channeled to less repulsive allies. Aid to Pakistan was also cut (in part because of concerns over its nuclear weapons), as was the Saudi contribution because of anger over the Gulf War. The U.S. announced that the Kabul government could stay in place during a transition and even participate in elections. Finally, in 1991, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed on a plan in which both sides would end their arms deliveries and bring the UN into a political settlement; in spite of the CIA's objections, Washington terminated its support for the resistance. The next year, the Kabul regime disintegrated and the guerrillas, joined by some of the former communists, took power and faced off against each other in a new civil war. 1
  

1) Newsom, statement in meeting of 30 March 1979, paraphrased in Gates (1996: 144); Brzezinski to Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” 26 December 1979 (CNN 1998: ep. 20); McWilliams to State, “ISI, Gulbuddin and Afghan Self-Determination,” mid-October 1988, quoted in Coll (2004: 183); also “Afghans: Now They Blame America,” New York Times Magazine, 4 February 1990; Cogan (1993); Rubin (1995a, 1995b); Cordovez and Harrison (1995); Scott (1996: ch. 3); McCoy (2003: ch. 9); Crile (2003). Note that the initial contacts between the mujahedin and the CIA date to 1978 (Schroen 2005: 43-4); note also that there is considerable controversy about whether, and if so how much, the Stinger missiles contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw.
  

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